The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has been used for decades as a model of behavioural interactions. From the celebrated performance of Tit for Tat, to the introduction of the zero-determinant strategies, to the use of sophisticated structures such as neural networks, the literature has been exploring the performance of strategies in the game for years. The results of the literature, however, have been relying on the performance of specific strategies in a finite number of tournaments. This manuscript evaluates 195 strategies' effectiveness in more than 40000 tournaments. The top ranked strategies are presented, and moreover, the impact of features on their success are analysed using machine learning techniques. The analysis determines that the cooperation ratio of a strategy in a given tournament compared to the mean and median cooperator is the most important feature. The conclusions are distinct for different types of tournaments. For instance a strategy with a theory of mind would aim to be the mean/median cooperator in standard tournaments, whereas in tournaments with probabilistic ending it would aim to cooperate 10% of the times the median cooperator did. 1 arXiv:2001.05911v1 [cs.GT] 16 Jan 2020 strategy. The winner was decided on the average score a strategy achieved. The winner of both tournaments was the simple strategy Tit For Tat which cooperated on the first turn and then simply copied the previous action of it's opponent. Due to the strategy's strong performance in both tournaments, and moreover in a series of evolutionary experiments [17], Tit For Tat was thought to be the most robust basic strategy in the IPD.
Background
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is a repeated two player game that models behavioural interactions, and more specifically, interactions where self-interest clashes with collective interest. At each turn of the game both players, simultaneously and independently, decide between cooperation (C) and defection (D) whilst having memory of their prior interactions. The payoffs for each player, at each turn, is influenced by their own choice and the choice of the other player. The payoffs of the game are generally defined by:
R S T P
where T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. The most common values used in the literature [17] are R = 3, P = 1, T = 5, S = 0. These values are also used in this work.
Conceptualising strategies and understanding the best way of playing the game has been of interest to the scientific community since the formulation of the game in 1950 [29] . Following the computer tournaments of Axelrod in the 1980's [15, 16] , a strategy's performance in a round robin computer tournament became a common evaluation technique for newly designed strategies. Today more than 200 strategies exist in the literature and several tournaments, following on from Axelrod's, have been undertaken [20, 35, 39, 59, 60] .
In the 80's, Axelrod performed two computer tournaments [15, 16] . The contestants were strategies submitted in the form of computer code. They competed against all other entries, a copy of themselves and a random 2 Data collection For the purposes of this manuscript a data set containing results of IPD tournaments has been generated and is available at [33] . This was done using the open source package Axelrod-Python library [4] (APL), and more specifically, version 3.0.0. APL allows for different types of IPD computer tournaments to be simulated whilst containing a list of over 180 strategies. Most of these are strategies described in the literature with a few exceptions being strategies that have been contributed specifically to the package. This paper make use of 195 strategies implemented in version 3.0.0. A list of the strategies is given in the Appendix B. Although APL features several tournament types, this work considers standard, noisy, probabilistic ending and noisy probabilistic ending tournaments.
Standard tournaments, are tournaments similar to that of Axelrod's in [15] . There are N strategies which all play an iterated game of n number of turns against each other. Note that self interactions are not included. Similarly, noisy tournaments have N strategies and n number of turns, but at each turn there is a probability p n that a player's action will be flipped. Probabilistic ending tournaments, are of size N and after each turn a match between strategies ends with a given probability p e . Finally, noisy probabilistic ending tournaments have both a noise probability p n and an ending probability p e . For smoothing the simulated results a tournament is repeated for k number of times. This was allowed to vary in order to evaluate the effect of smoothing. The winner of each tournament is based on the average score a strategy achieved and not by the number of wins.
The process of collecting tournament results implemented in this manuscript is described by Algorithm 1. For each trial a random size N is selected, and from the 195 strategies a random list of N strategies is chosen. For the given list of strategies a standard, a noisy, a probabilistic ending and a noisy probabilistic ending tournament are performed and repeated k times. The parameters for the tournaments, as well as the number of repetitions, are selected once for each trial. The parameters and their respective minimum and maximum values are given by Table 1 . The source code for the data collection, as well as the source code for the analysis, which will be discussed in the following sections, have been written following best practices [5, 21] . It has been packaged and is available here.
A total of 11420 trials of Algorithm 1 have been run. For each trial the results for 4 different tournaments were collected, thus a total of 45686 (11420 × 4) tournament results have been retrieved. Each tournament outputs a result summary in the form of Table 2 . Each strategy have participated on average in 5154 tournaments of each type. The strategy with the maximum participation in each tournament type is Inverse Punisher with 5639 entries. The strategy with the minimum entries is EvolvedLookerUp 1 1 1 which was selected in 4693 trials.
The result summary, Table 2 , has N rows because each row contains information for each strategy that participated in the tournament. The information includes the strategy's rank, median score, the rate with which the strategy cooperated (C r ), its match win count and the probability that the strategy cooperated in the opening move. Moreover, the probabilities of a strategy being in any of the four states (CC, CD, DC, DD), and the rate of which the strategy cooperated after each state. A feature that has been manually included is the normalised rank. The rank of a given strategy, denoted as R, can vary between 0 and N − 1. Thus, the normalised rank, denoted as r, is calculated as a strategy's rank divided by the tournament's size N − 1.
In the next section the performance of these strategies is evaluated based on their normalised rank.
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Top ranked strategies
This section evaluates the performance of 195 IPD strategies. The performance of each strategy is evaluated in four tournament types, which were presented in Section 2, followed by an evaluation of their performance over all the 45686 simulated tournaments of this work.
Each strategy participated in multiple tournaments of the same type (on average 5154). For example Tit For Tat participated in a total of 5114 tournaments of each type. The strategy's normalised rank distribution in these is given in Figure 1 . A value of r = 0 corresponds to a strategy winning the tournament where a value of r = 1 corresponds to the strategy coming last. Because of the strategies' multiple entries their performance is evaluated based on the median normalised rank denoted asr.
The top 15 strategies for each tournament type based onr are given in Table 3 . Table 3 : Top performances for each tournament type based onr.
In standard tournaments 10 out of the 15 top strategies are introduced in [35] . These are strategies based on finite state automata (FSM), hidden markov models (HMM), artificial neural networks (ANN), lookup tables (LookerUp) and stochastic lookup tables (Gambler) that have been trained using reinforcement learning algorithms (evolutionary and particle swarm algorithms). They have been trained to perform well against the strategies in APL in a standard tournament, thus their performance in the specific setting was anticipated. DoubleCrosser, and Fool Me Once, are strategies not from the literature but from the APL. DoubleCrosser is a strategy that makes use of the number of turns because it is set to defect on the last two rounds. The strategy was expected to not perform as well in tournaments where the number of turns is not specified, but the strategy did not perform well in tournaments with noise either. Finally, Winner 12 [46] and DBS [13] are both from the the literature. DBS is strategy specifically designed for noisy environments, however, it ranks highly only in standard ones. Figure 2 gives the distributions of r for the top ranked strategies. The distributions are skewed towards zero and the highest median, of the top 15 strategies, is at 0.075. This indicates that the top ranked strategies perform well in any given standard tournament, regardless of the opponents and the number of turns.
Evolved HMM 5 Evolved FSM 16 EvolvedLookerUp2_2_2
Evolved The top strategies in noisy tournaments are shown in Figure 3 . These include deterministic strategies, such as Tit For 2 Tats [16] , Slow Tit For Two Tats [4] , Hard Tit For 2 Tats [60] and Cycler CCCCCD, and strategies which decide their actions based on the cooperations to defections ratio, such as ShortMem [23] , Grumpy and e [4] . Slow Tit For Two Tats is the same strategy as Tit For 2 Tats, and at the time of writing this manuscript the contributors of [4] made a new release where the strategy has been removed. However, for the purpose of this work the strategy is kept. The Retaliate and Limited Retaliate strategies are implemented in APL by the same contributor. They are strategies designed to defect if the opponent has tricked them more often than x% of the times that they have done the same. Finally, in 4 th and 9 th place are Hunter strategies which try to extort strategies that play cyclically and defectors.
From Figure 3 , it is evident that the normalised rank distributions in noisy environments are more variant with higher medians compared to standard tournaments. The distributions are bimodal. This indicates that although the top ranked strategies mainly performed well, there are several tournaments that they ranked in the bottom half. The bimodality of the r distributions can be explained by Figure 3 which gives the r distributions for the top 6 strategies over the noise probability p n . Note that for p n = 0.5 a strategy corresponds to a random player and for p n = 1 a strategy is behaving in the exact opposite way than its design. From Figure 4 it is evident that the strategies highly ranked in noisy environments did so because of their performance in tournaments with p n > 0.5. In tournaments with a noise probability lower than 0.5 the strategies performed poorly which is why their r distributions are bimodal. If during the data collection a p n strictly less 0.5 was considered then the top ranked strategies would be different. There are a total of 5661 trials where p n < 0.5 and the top ranked strategies are given in Table 4 . The median ranks are lower than before and the top spots are mainly overtaken by Meta strategies which include NMWE deterministic and NMWE Long Memory. The Meta strategies [4] create a team of strategies for themselves and choose to play as a member of their team based on their scores against a given opponent. Table 4 : Top performances in 5661 noisy tournaments where p n < 0.5.
The 15 top ranked strategies in probabilistic ending tournaments include Fortress 3, Fortress 4 (both introduced in [11] ), Raider [12] and Solution B1 [12] , which are strategies based on finite state automata introduced by Daniel and Wendy Ashlock. These strategies have been evolved using reinforcement learning, however, there were trained to maximise their payoffs in tournaments with fixed turns (150 specifically) and not in probabilistic ending ones. In probabilistic ending tournaments it appears that the top ranks are mostly occupied by defecting strategies. These include Better and Better, Gradual Killer, Hard Prober (all from [1] ), Bully (Reverse Tit For Tat) [50] and Defector. Thus, it's surprisingly that EasyGo and Fool Me Forever which are strategies that will defect until their opponent defect, then they will cooperate until the end, ranked 14 th and 15 th . Upon inspection, it was found that they are actually the same strategy. This was not known to the authors at the time of data collection. Figure 5 verifies that their performance is the same. Both strategies have repeatedly ranked highly and there are cases for which they were the winners of the tournament.
The distributions of the normalised rank in probabilistic ending tournaments, shown in Figure 5 , are less variant than those of noisy tournaments. The medians of the top 15 strategies are lower than 0.1 and the distributions are skewed towards 0. Though the large difference between the means and the medians indicates some outliers, the strategies have overall performed well in the probabilistic ending tournaments that they participated.
The distributions of r for the top 6 strategies in probabilistic ending tournaments over p e are given in Figure 6 . Figure 6 shows that the 6 strategies start of with a high median rank, however, their ranked decreased as the the probability of the game ending increased and at the point of p e = 0.1 they became the dominant strategies in their respective tournaments. In essence, what is demonstrated is that defecting strategies did better when the likelihood of the game ending in the next turn increased, which is inline with the Folk Theorem [31] . If tournaments where the probability of the game ending was less than 0.1 were considered then the the top ranked spots are not dominated by just defecting strategies anymore, as shown in Table 5 . Instead the effective strategies are now the Meta strategies, trained strategies, Grudger [4] and Spiteful Tit for Tat [1] .
In tournaments with both noise and an unspecified number of turns several of the top ranked strategies are strategies that were highly ranked in noisy tournaments. However, strategies from the top ranks in probabilistic ending tournaments did not rank highly here. Other strategies include π, φ which are based on the same approach as e. The distributions of r shown in Figure 7 have the largest median values compared to the top rank strategies of the other tournament types. A subset of noisy probabilistic ending tournaments has been considered such that p e < 0.1 and p n < 0.5. The top ranked strategies are given in Table 6 and it is shown that the Meta strategies which performed well in noisy tournaments with p n < 0.5, perform well once again even the number of turns is not specified. Moreover, several strategies that did well in probabilistic ending tournaments such as Fortress 3, Fortress 4, Defector and Better and Better are effective here as well.
Up till now, the performances of the 195 strategies have been evaluated for individual tournament types. The distributions of r for the tournament types indicate that for probabilistic ending and standard tournaments Table 6 : Top performances in 568 probabilistic ending tournaments with p e < 0.1 and p n < 0.5.
successful strategies do exist. For these settings, the top 15 strategies have frequently ranked in the top spots with only a few exceptions. Contrarily, it appears that noise cause variation in the normalised ranks, and the strategies can always guarantee a spot in the top ranks.
The data set considered in this work, described in Section 2, contains a total of 45686 tournament results. For this part of the manuscript the strategies are ranked based on the median normalised rank they achieved over the entire data set. The top 15 strategies are given in Table 7 and their normalised rank distributions are given in Figure 8 . Table 7 : Top performances over all the tournaments
Namer
The top ranks include strategies that have been previously mentioned. The set of Retaliate strategies occupy the top spots followed by BackStabber and DoubleCrosser. The distributions of the Retaliate strategies have no statistical difference. Thus, in an IPD tournament where the type is not specified, playing as any of the Retaliate strategies seems like a good approach. DoubleCrosser performed well in standard tournaments and the strategy is just an extension of BackStabber. It should be noted that these strategies can be characterised as "cheaters". The source code of the strategies allows them to known the number of turns in a match (if they are specified). PSO Gambler and Evolved HMM 5 are trained strategies introduced in [35] and Nice Meta Winner and NMWE Memory One are strategies based on teams. Grudger is a strategy from Axelrod's original tournament and Forgetful Fool Me Once is based on the same approach as Grudger. Overall the top 15 strategies are fundamentally different. Some are cheaters, some are complex, others are simple deterministic strategies and strategies based on teams. The results of 45686 tournaments used in this work imply the following: there is not a single type of strategy which can performance well in any IPD interaction.
This section presented the winning strategies in a series of IPD tournaments. In standard tournaments the top spots were dominated by complex strategies that had been trained using reinforcement learning techniques. In noisy environments, whether the number of turns was fixed or not, the winning strategies were deterministic strategies designed to defect if the opponent tricked them more than a current amount of the times that they had tricked their opponent. However, if a value of noise strictly less than 0.5 was considered, then the successful strategies were strategies based on the behaviour of many strategies. In probabilistic ending tournaments most of the highly ranked strategies were defecting strategies and trained finite state automata, all by the authors of [11, 12] . These strategies ranked high due to their performance in tournaments where the probability of the game ending after each turn was bigger than 0.1. Finally the performance of all 195 strategies over the 45686 tournaments in this manuscript was assessed onr. The top ranked strategies were a mixture of behaviours that did well in standard tournaments and tournaments with noise, as well as a few strategies based on teams. Top performances in overall tournaments Figure 8 : r distributions for best performed strategies in the data set [33] .
The results of this section imply that successful strategies for specific settings exist for an IPD tournament. The top ranked strategies in both standard tournaments and tournaments with probabilistic ending, managed to rank in the top 10% of the tournament most of the times. Strategies in noisy environments demonstrated that no strategy can be consistently successful, except if the value of noise is constrained to less than a half.
Overall, there has been not a single strategy that has shown to perform well in more than one setting. The aim of the next section is to understand the features that made these strategies successful, in each setting separately but also overall.
Evaluation of performance
The aim of this section is to explore the features that contribute to a strategy's successful performance. The features explored are measures regarding a strategy's behaviour, along with measures regarding the tournaments the strategies competed in. These are given in Table 8 .
APL makes use of classifiers to classify strategies according to various dimensions. These determine whether a strategy is stochastic or deterministic, whether it makes use of the number of turns or the game's payoffs. The memory usage feature is calculated as the memory size of strategy (which is specified in the strategies implementation in the APL) divide by the number of turns. For example, Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 has a memory size of 16 and participated in a tournament where n was 134. In the given tournament Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 has a memory usage of 0.119. For tournaments with a probabilistic ending the number of turns was not collected, so the memory usage feature is not used for probabilistic ending tournaments. The SSE is a feature introduced in [41] which shows how close a strategy is to behaving as a ZDs, and subsequently, in an extortionate way. The method identifies the ZDs closest to a given strategy and calculates the algebraic distance between them, defined as SSE. A SSE value of 1 indicates no extortionate behaviour at all whereas a value of 0 indicates that a strategy is behaving a ZDs. The rest of the features considered are the CC to C, CD to C, DC to C, and DD to C rates as well as cooperating ratio of a strategy. The minimum, maximum, medium and median cooperating ratios of each tournament are also included, and finally the number of turns, The cooperating ratio of a strategy result summary float
The probability a strategy will cooperate after a mutual cooperation result summary float
The probability a strategy will cooperate after being betrayed by the opponent result summary float
The probability a strategy will cooperate after betraying the opponent result summary float
The probability a strategy will cooperate after a mutual defection result summary float 0 1 pn
The probability of a player's action being flip at each interaction trial summary float 0 1 n
The number of turns trial summary integer 1 200 pe
The probability of a match ending in the next turn trial summary float 0 1 N
The number of strategies in the tournament trial summary integer 3 195 k
The number of repetitions of a given tournament trial summary integer 10 100 Table 8 : The features which are included in the performance evaluation analysis.
the number of strategies, the number of repetitions and the probabilities of noise and the game ending are also included. Table 9 shows the correlation coefficients between the features of Table 8 the median score and the median normalised rank. Note that the correlation for the classifiers is not included because they are binary variables and they will be evaluated using a different method. The correlation coefficients for all the features in Table 8 against themselves have also been calculated and a graphical representation can be found in the Appendix C. Table 9 : Correlations table between the features of Table 8 the normalised rank and the median score.
In standard tournaments the features CC to C, C r , C r /C max and the cooperating ratio compared to C median and C mean have a moderate negative effect on the normalised rank, and a moderate positive on the median score. The SSE error and the DD to C have the opposite effects. Thus, in standard tournaments behaving cooperatively corresponds to a more successful performance. Even though being nice pays off, that's not true against defective strategies. Cooperating after a mutual defection lowers a strategy's success. Figure 9 confirms that the winners of standard tournaments always cooperate after a mutual cooperation and almost always defects after a mutual defection. Compared to standard tournaments, in both noisy and in probabilistic ending tournaments the higher the rates of cooperation the lower a strategy's success and median score. A strategy would want to cooperate less than both the mean and median cooperator in such settings. In probabilistic ending tournaments the correlations coefficients have a larger values, indicating a stronger effect. Thus a strategy will be punished more by it's cooperative behaviour in probabilistic ending environments, this was seen in Section 4 as well.
The distributions of the C r of the winners in both tournaments is given by Figure 10 . It confirms that the winners in noisy tournaments cooperated less than 35% of the times and in probabilistic ending tournaments less than 10%. In noisy probabilistic ending tournaments and in over all the tournaments' results, the only features that had a moderate affect are C r /C mean , C r /C max and C r . In such environments cooperative behaviour appears to be punished by not as much as in noisy and probabilistic ending tournaments. To further explore the features that contribute to a strategy's success the performances are divided into clusters based on whether they were successful or not. A random forest approach [22] is then applied to each performance to predict the cluster to which it has been assigned to. This allows for the importance of each feature in the classification to be calculated. In essence, to calculate which are the important features when one is trying to predict whether a performance was successful or not.
The performances are clustered into successful and unsuccessful clusters based on 4 different approaches.
More specifically:
• Approach 1: The performances are divided into two clusters based on whether their performance was in the top 5% of their respective tournaments. Thus, whether r was smaller or larger than 0.05.
• Approach 2: The performances are divided into two clusters based on whether their performance was in the top 25% of their respective tournaments. Thus, whether r was smaller or larger than 0.25.
• Approach 3: The performances are divided into two clusters based on whether their performance was in the top 50% of their respective tournaments. Thus, whether r was smaller or larger than 0.50.
• Approach 4: The performances are clustered based on their normalised rank and their median score by a k−means algorithm [8] . The number of clusters is not deterministically chosen but it is based on the silhouette coefficients [57] .
The random forest method constructs many individual decision trees and the predictions from all trees are pooled to make the final prediction. The random forest models are trained on a training set of 70% of the tournaments results. The accuracy of each model based on R 2 and the number of clusters for each tournament type (because in the case of Approach 4 it is not deterministically chosen) are given by Table 10 . The out of the bag error (OOB) [36] has also been calculated. The models fit well, and a high value of both the accuracy measures on the test data and the OOB error indicate that the model is not over fitting. Table 10 : Accuracy metrics for random forest models.
The importance that the features of Table 8 had on each random forest model while the perfomances were clustered based on the different approaches have been calculated and are given by Figures 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 . These show that the classifiers stochastic, make use of game and make use of length have no significant effect, and several of the features that are highlighted by the importance are inline with the correlation results. Moreover, the smoothing parameter k appears to no have a significant effect either. The most important features based on the random forest analysis were C r /C median and C r /C mean . The effect of both these features can be further explored. In Figure 16 the distributions of C r /C mean and C r /C median are given for the winners in standard tournaments. A value of C r /C mean = 1 imply that the cooperating ratio of the winner was the same as the mean/median cooperating ratio of the tournament. In standard tournaments, the mean for both ratios is 1. Therefore, an effective strategy in standard tournaments was the mean/median cooperator of its respective tournament. In comparison, Figure 17 shows the distributions of the features for the winners in noisy tournaments where the mean is at 0.67. Thereupon the winners cooperated 67% of the times the mean/median cooperator did. This analysis is applied to the rest of the tournaments and the distributions are given by Figures 18, 19 and 20 . In a tournament with noisy and a probabilistic ending the winners cooperated 60%, whereas in settings that the type of the tournament can vary between the types considered in this work the winners cooperated 67% of the times the mean or median cooperator did. Finally, in probabilistic ending tournament it has already been mentioned that defecting strategies prevail and this result is once again confirmed in this section. Figure 18 : Distributions of C r /C median and C r /C median for winners of probabilistic ending tournaments.
In this section the effect of several features, regarding a strategy's behaviour and the tournament in which it participated on its performance were presented. This was done using two approaches. Correlation coefficients and a random forest analysis. The results of these are summarised in the following section. 
Conclusion
This manuscript has explored the performance of 195 strategies of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in a large number of computer tournaments. The results of the analysis demonstrated that, although for specific tournament types such as standard and probabilistic ending tournaments, dominant strategies exist there is not a single dominant type of strategies if the environments vary. Moreover, a strategy with a theory of mind should aim to adapt its behaviour based on the mean and median cooperators and should in general not be too cooperative.
The 195 strategies used in this manuscript have been mainly from the literature, and they have been accessible due to an open source software called the Axelrod-Python library. The software was used to generate a total of 45686 computer tournaments results with different number of strategies and different participants each time. The data collection was described in Section 2. In Section 3, the tournaments results were used to present the top performances. The data set contained results from four different settings, and these were also studied individually. In standard tournaments complex strategies trained using reinforcement learning ranked in the top spots. Some of these strategies ranked again in the top spots in probabilistic ending tournaments when a p e of less 0.1 was considered. In probabilistic ending tournaments p e was designed to vary between 0 and 1. It was demonstrated that for values larger than 0.1, as stated in the Folk Theorem, defecting strategies were winning the tournaments because there was a high likelihood of the game ending in the next turn. In tournaments with noise the median ranks of the top 15 strategies had the highest values and the r distributions were bimodal. The top rank strategies were performing both well and bad, and this indicates that in noisy tournaments there are not strategies that can guarantee winning. Overall, the top ranked strategies differed from one tournament type to another and the mechanism behind the winning strategies were all different. Even strategies designed to perform well in one setting were demonstrated to be better in others.
Section 4, covered an analysis of performance based on several features associated with a strategy and with the environments it was competing. The results of this analysis showed that a strategy's characteristics such as whether or not it's stochastic, and the information it used regarding the game had no effect on the strategy's success. The most important features have been those that compared the strategy's behaviour to it's environment. The cooperating ratio of the strategy compared to the mean and median cooperator was highlighted as the most important feature in the analysis. More specifically, if a strategy were to enter a tournament with a theory of mind of its environment it would choose to be the median cooperator in standard tournaments, to cooperate 10% of the time the median cooperator did in probabilistic ending tournaments and 60% in noisy and noisy probabilistic tournaments. Lastly, if a strategy was aware of the opponents but not of the setting of the tournament, a strategy would be more likely to be successful if it were to identify the median cooperator and cooperated 67% of the times that they did.
The data set described in this work contains the largest number of IPD tournaments, to the authors knowledge, and available at [33] . Further data mining could be applied and provide new insights in the field. feature feature explanation stochastic If a strategy is stochastic makes use of game If a strategy makes used of the game information makes use of length If a strategy makes used of the number of turns memory usage
The memory size of a strategy divided by the number of turns SSE A measure of how far a strategy is from extortionate behaviour C max
The biggest cooperating rate in the tournament C min
The smallest cooperating rate in the tournament C median
The median cooperating rate in the tournament C mean
The mean cooperating rate in the tournament C r / C max A strategy's cooperating rate divided by the maximum C r / C min A strategy's cooperating rate divided by the minimum C r / C median A strategy's cooperating rate divided by the median C r / C mean A strategy's cooperating rate divided by the mean C r
The cooperating ratio of a strategy CC to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after a mutual cooperation CD to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after being betrayed by the opponent DC to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after betraying the opponent DD to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after a mutual defection p n
The probability of a player's action being flip at each interaction n
The number of turns p e
The probability of a match ending in the next turn N
The number of strategies in the tournament k
The number that a given tournament is repeated 
B List of strategies
The strategies used in this study which are from Axelrod-Python library version 3.0.0.
90. Level Punisher [7] 91. Limited Retaliate 2 [4] 92. Limited Retaliate 3 [4] 93. Limited Retaliate [4] 94. MEM2 [45] 95. Math Constant Hunter [4] 96. Meta Hunter Aggressive [4] 97. Meta Hunter [4] 98. Meta Majority [4] 99. Meta Majority Finite Memory [4] 100. Meta Majority Long Memory [4] 101. Meta Majority Memory One [4] 102. Meta Minority [4] 103. Meta Mixer [4] 104. Meta Winner [4] 105. Meta Winner Deterministic [4] 106. Meta Winner Ensemble [4] 107. Meta Winner Finite Memory [4] 108. Meta Winner Long Memory [4] 109. Meta Winner Memory One [4] 110. Meta Winner Stochastic [4] 111. NMWE Deterministic [4] 112. NMWE Finite Memory [4] 113. NMWE Long Memory [4] 114. NMWE Memory One [4] 115. NMWE Stochastic [4] 116. Naive Prober [44] 117. Negation [62] 118. Nice Average Copier [4] 119. Nice Meta Winner [4] 120. Nice Meta Winner Ensemble [4] 121. Nydegger [15] 122. Omega TFT [40] 123. Once Bitten [4] 124. Opposite Grudger [4] 125. PSO Gambler 1 1 1 [4] 126. PSO Gambler 2 2 2 [4] 127. PSO Gambler 2 2 2 Noise 05 [4] 128. PSO Gambler Mem1 [4] 129. Predator [11] 130. Prober [44] 131. Prober 2 [1] 132. Prober 3 [1] 133. Prober 4 [1] 134. Pun1 [11] 135. Punisher [4] 136. Raider [12] 137. Random Hunter [4] 138. Random: 0.5 [15, 61] 139. Remorseful Prober [44] 140. Resurrection [7] 141. Retaliate 2 [4] 142. Retaliate 3 [4] 143. Retaliate [4] 144. Revised Downing [15] 145. Ripoff [10] 146. Risky QLearner [4] 147. SelfSteem [24] 148. ShortMem [24] 149. Shubik [15] 150. Slow Tit For Two Tats [4] 151. Slow Tit For Two Tats 2 [1] 152. Sneaky Tit For Tat [4] 153. Soft Go By Majority [17, 48] 154. Soft Go By Majority 10 [4] 155. Soft Go By Majority 20 [4] 156. Soft Go By Majority 40 [4] 157. Soft Go By Majority 5 [4] 158. Soft Grudger [44] 159. Soft Joss [1] 160. SolutionB1 [9] 161. SolutionB5 [9] 162. Spiteful Tit For Tat [1] 163. Stalker [23] 164. Stein and Rapoport [15] 165. Stochastic Cooperator [6] 166. Stochastic WSLS [4] 167. Suspicious Tit For Tat [19, 37] 168. TF1 [4] 169. TF2 [4] 170. TF3 [4] 171. Tester [16] 172. ThueMorse [4] 173. ThueMorseInverse [4] 174. Thumper [10] 175. Tit For 2 Tats (Tf2T) [17] 176. Tit For Tat (TfT) [15] 177. Tricky Cooperator [4] 178. Tricky Defector [4] 179. Tullock [15] 180. Two Tits For Tat (2TfT) [17] 181. VeryBad [24] 182. Willing [63] 
Win-Shift
Lose-Stay (WShLSt) [44] 
Win-Stay
Lose-Shift (WSLS) [42, 51, 60] 185. Winner12 [46] 186. Winner21 [46] 187. Worse and Worse [1] 188. Worse and Worse 2 [1] 189. Worse and Worse 3 [1] 190. ZD-Extort-2 v2 [43] 191. ZD-Extort-2 [60] 192. ZD-Extort-4 [4] 193. ZD-GEN-2 [43] 194. ZD-GTFT-2 [60] 195. ZD-SET-2 [43] 
C Correlation coefficients
A graphical representation of the correlation coefficients for the features in Table 8 . Table 8 for data set
